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I. INTRODUCTION 
Little if any attention in the national discourse on reparations has 
been given to the question of whether the United States Supreme Court 
has an institutional moral duty to atone for its participation in the 
atrocities of slavery and Jim Crow.  By “atonement” I mean two things: a 
statement of apology and an act of redemption that concretizes the 
apology, making it believable.1  Properly speaking, this act of redemption 
is called a “reparation.”2  Hence, atonement is defined as an apology plus 
an accompanying reparation, and a reparation is defined as the tangible 
act that transforms the rhetoric of apology into a material, meaningful 
reality.  There is, then, a strong correlation between an apology and a 
reparation. 
The question of judicial atonement can be analyzed through a series 
of cognate questions.  First, what approach should we use in analyzing 
the question of judicial atonement?3  This is the threshold question.  
Second, can the Court’s moral culpability for slavery and Jim Crow be 
established?4  Third, is the Court’s post-Brown v. Board of Education, 
post-Jim Crow judicial philosophy sufficient to atone for slavery and Jim 
Crow?5  Assuming the answer to that question is negative, then a final 
question arises: is it possible to construct a new judicial philosophy that 
atones for slavery and Jim Crow?6  I shall address these questions 
seriatim. 
                                                          
  *  Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
 1. See ROY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK 
REPARATIONS ix (2004) [hereinafter BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS] (noting that 
“[a]tonement would give our government moral credibility and direction through the fog that often 
engulfs contemporary racial matters”). 
 2. Id. at 155. 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 5. See infra Part IV. 
 6. See infra Part V. 
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II. HOW TO APPROACH THE QUESTION OF JUDICIAL ATONEMENT 
Tommie Shelby, a young black philosopher at Harvard, argues in his 
book, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black 
Solidarity, that civil rights theory, insofar as it relates to blacks, “must 
not be utopian—[that is] applicable only in an . . . ideal but unrealizable 
world—but must [instead] be politically viable given the sociohistorical 
circumstances of contemporary black Americans.”7  I profoundly 
disagree.  As I argue extensively in Racial Justice in the Age of Obama,8 
our earliest civil rights theories were utopian when first articulated.  The 
theory of abolition during the antebellum period and the theory of equal 
rights during Jim Crow seemed sappy and farcical to many on both sides 
of the color line.  Yet, black leaders like Frederick Douglass and Martin 
Luther King, Jr., were assiduous proponents of abolition and equal rights, 
respectively.9 
These civil rights theories—abolition and equal rights—were simply 
ahead of their times.  The nation had to catch up, and when it did, it 
changed in the most practical of ways.  But like all successful 
revolutionary ideas, abolition and equal rights passed through certain 
stages before they were regarded as truths.  Indeed, Arthur 
Schopenhauer, the great German philosopher (1788–1860), insists that 
“[e]very truth passes through three stages before it is recognized.  In the 
first stage it is ridiculed, in the second it is opposed, in the third it is 
regarded as self-evident.”10 
This suggests that theorists who endeavor to address the issue of 
reparations should think big.  They should demonstrate the courage to 
dream like Frederick Douglass and Martin Luther King, Jr.  This does 
not mean, of course, that the sky is the limit and we should all be space 
cadets.  Reparations should be limited by what can be called “practical 
idealism.”  This simply means that the reparatory duty should fall within 
the reach of morally motivated individuals and institutions.  When the 
perpetrator of an atrocity is asked to redress its own wrongdoing, the 
requested reparation should be something that a person of probity and 
intelligence, acting individually or institutionally, is physically capable 
                                                          
 7. TOMMIE SHELBY, WE WHO ARE DARK: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF BLACK 
SOLIDARITY 250 (2005). 
 8. ROY L. BROOKS, RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF OBAMA (forthcoming 2009). 
 9. See, e.g., FREDERICK DOUGLASS, LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: HIS EARLY 
LIFE AS A SLAVE, HIS ESCAPE FROM BONDAGE, AND HIS COMPLETE HISTORY  (First Collier Books 
1962) (1892); Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in THE AMERICAN CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT: READINGS & INTERPRETATIONS 320–31 (Raymond D’Angelo ed., 2001). 
 10. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS, supra note 1, at ix. 
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of doing.  Hence, as theorists, our job is to seek coherent, logical, and 
morally desirable prescriptions before the horse trading and ox-going 
(i.e., politics) begin. 
Practical idealism, then, comes into play at the reparatory stage of 
atonement.  The “idealism” in practical idealism helps to shape morally 
responsive reparations.  The “practical” in practical idealism narrowly 
tailors the reparation to the nature and scope of the antecedent atrocity.  
We begin the reparatory process with a firm understanding of the 
perpetrator’s moral transgression. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S MORAL CULPABILITY 
During slavery and Jim Crow, the Court consistently validated a 
racist ideology that had both the intent and effect of subordinating blacks 
in case after case.  The consequences for blacks were dire and lasting.  
Blacks were denied basic liberties, including, in many instances, the right 
to life itself.11  Slavery created, and Jim Crow perpetuated, no dearth of 
capital deficiencies in black America—financial capital deficiencies (i.e., 
property and income), human capital deficiencies (i.e., formal education 
and skills), and social capital deficiencies (i.e., the lack of social rank and 
respect and the inability to get things done). 
Several landmark cases illustrate how the Court oppressed black 
Americans: Dred Scott v. Sandford,12 arguably the most infamous Court 
decision in history, the Civil Rights Cases,13 a post-bellum consolidated 
case that dug a large civil rights hole for the recently freed slaves, and 
Plessy v. Ferguson,14 a case that shoved blacks into this racial abyss.  
Acting through its interpretive function, the Court in these cases 
constitutionalized the oppression of blacks by the government and 
private parties. 
                                                          
 11. See generally JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO 
FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 14 (6th ed. 1988) (explaining that the Slave Codes 
deemed slaves not to be persons, but property, and that laws were designed to protect the owners’ 
property rights in slaves); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 6 (1978) (noting that “the Constitution’s 
references to justice, welfare, and liberty were mocked by the treatment” of blacks by the legal 
system throughout the Nation’s early history). 
 12. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV. 
 13. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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A. Dred Scott v. Sandford 
 In Dred Scott, the Court had an opportunity to delegitimize, or at 
least limit, the legitimacy of human bondage.15  Rather than pursuing 
either course of action, the Court chose to give its imprimatur to 
America’s greatest atrocity.  The facts of the case are not complicated.  
Dred Scott was a slave living in a free state, having been brought there 
by his master.16  He sued his master in federal court to secure his 
freedom.17  The Court ruled against Dred Scott, holding that blacks, 
whether enslaved or free, were not citizens of the United States and, 
therefore, had no legal status to sue in federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction.18  The Court’s holding was based on more than an originalist 
interpretation of the Constitution.  Moving beyond the text of the 
Constitution, Chief Justice Taney also relied upon public policy 
considerations.  He noted that if Dred Scott succeeded in this litigation, 
his owner, who had brought Dred Scott and his wife into the free state of 
Illinois for an extended period of time, would be deprived of his 
property.19  The Court, in other words, determined slaves were nothing 
more than property.20  To drive home this point, the Court observed that 
blacks: 
[H]ad for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an 
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, 
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had 
no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and [so] . . . the 
negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.21 
Clearly, the Court’s judicial philosophy—originalism—was a fig leaf 
for the Court’s racism and unconditioned support of slavery.  As the late 
Judge A. Leon Higginbotham has noted, “[t]he opinion of the Court, 
                                                          
 15. 60 U.S. at 393. 
 16. Id. at 458–59. 
 17. Id. at 400. 
 18. See id. at 404–05, 407.  Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution extends the judicial power 
of the United States to citizens of different states.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 19. 60 U.S. at 450–51. 
 20. Id.; see supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 21. 60 U.S. at 407; see also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL 
POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 65 (1996) [hereinafter 
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM] But cf. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS, supra 
note 1, at 133-34 (discussing the inaccuracies in Chief Justice Taney’s originalist argument in Dred 
Scott); Alexander Tsesis, Undermining Inalienable Rights: From Dred Scott to the Rehnquist Court, 
39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1179, 1200–07 (2007) (also discussing the Chief Justice’s inaccuracies in Dred 
Scott). 
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while clothed in the usual garments of legal theory, was in effect nothing 
more than a southern manifesto on the institution of slavery.”22  
Although the Fourteenth Amendment would give blacks citizenship, 
thereby reversing the specific holding in Dred Scott,23 the Court 
continued its pattern of juridical subordination long after that 
Amendment’s ratification. 
B. The Civil Rights Cases24 and Plessy v. Ferguson25 
During the post-bellum period, blacks were still regarded by most 
whites as beast-like, unteachable, uncouth, odious, and inferior to whites 
in every essential respect.  Blacks were subjected to laws and customs 
that perpetuated the capital deficiencies wrought by slavery.  Racially 
repressive Slave Codes, enacted in the South during slavery to control 
slaves and free blacks alike, were replaced after Reconstruction with a 
rigid regime of segregation laws in the South.26  The constitutional 
legitimacy of these laws, known as “Jim Crow” laws, was presented to 
the Court at the end of the nineteenth century in Plessy v. Ferguson.27  
However, several cases, consolidated in a single case, set the stage for 
Plessy and the subsequent constitutionalization of Jim Crow. 
Known as the Civil Rights Cases, five of these cases were 
consolidated before the Court in 1883.28  The Court held that Congress 
lacked the authority under the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to ban racial discrimination by private individuals and 
organizations.29  This holding made it difficult for Congress to protect 
black Americans from racial oppression.  For this reason, Justice Harlan 
wrote a dissenting opinion challenging the Court’s narrow interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  He argued that Congress, in enacting the 
civil rights legislation, was attempting to overcome an intolerable 
situation: southern states refusing to grant black citizens the same legal 
rights granted to white citizens.30 
 
                                                          
 22. HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 21, at 61. 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are 
citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
 24. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 25. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 26. See BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS, supra note 1, at 22–23, 64. 
 27. 163 U.S. 537. 
 28. 109 U.S. 3. 
 29. Id. at 10–11. 
 30. Id. at 26–27 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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If the Civil Rights Cases dug a large hole for black Americans, 
Plessy pushed blacks into that hole.  In Plessy, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute that segregated riders on railway 
cars.  The Court’s holding constitutionalized the “separate-but-equal 
doctrine” under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The separate-but-equal doctrine states that the races are to 
be held separate, but equal, meaning, of course, unequal.31  This doctrine 
established the constitutional foundation for Jim Crow laws, which 
permitted states to create separate schools, separate drinking foundations, 
separate hospitals, and so on.32 
Plessy, in short, gave the nation constitutional cover to subordinate 
blacks, plain and simple.  The racial segregation and discrimination that 
took place under the separate-but-equal doctrine made a mockery of the 
equality part of the doctrine.  As John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. 
Moss, Jr., have noted: 
 By 1898 the pattern for the constitutional disfranchisement of blacks 
had been completely drawn.  In subsequent years other states followed 
the lead of Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana.  By 1910 blacks 
had been effectively disfranchised by constitutional provisions in North 
Carolina, Alabama, Virginia, Georgia, and Oklahoma. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he Negro was banned from white hotels, barber shops, 
restaurants, and theatres. . . . [M]ost Southern states had laws requiring 
separate schools.33 
Jim Crow was not, however, limited to the South.  The Civil Rights 
Cases and Plessy were decided under the Constitution and, therefore, 
established national law.  The North, although not as segregated by law 
(de jure segregation) as the South, was certainly segregated by custom 
(de facto segregation).34  As Harry Ashmore has pointed out, “[t]he  
 
                                                          
 31. See ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES 9–11 (3d 
ed. 2005) [hereinafter BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION]. 
 32. Id. at 9. 
 33. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS, 
265–66 (5th ed. 1988); see also id. at 235–38 (providing an overview of constitutional 
disfranchisement of blacks). 
 34. For an explanation of de jure and de facto segregation, along with an overview of Jim Crow 
laws and customs, see generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d ed. 
1966). 
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concept of white supremacy had been exalted in the South in defense of 
slavery, but it was by no means confined to the region.”35 
As he had in the Civil Rights Cases,36 Justice Harlan dissented in 
Plessy, challenging, once again, the Court’s narrow interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  In his famous dissent, Justice Harlan argued: 
“[o]ur constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes 
among citizens. . . .  The law regards man as man, and takes no account 
of his surroundings or of his color . . . .”37  Justice Harlan’s opinion gave 
birth to the “color-blind principle,” which would eventually become the 
principal interpretative standard for the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause after Brown v. Board of Education.38 
It is important to note, however, that Justice Harlan himself did not 
envision the color-blind principle doing much, if anything, to change the 
social condition of blacks relative to whites.  As he said: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.  
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in 
power.  So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains 
true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of 
constitutional liberty.39 
Thus, Justice Harlan saw the color-blind principle as changing only the 
legal status of blacks rather than their socioeconomic status.  In his view, 
a color-blind Constitution would not upset the prevailing racial order—
whites would always be on top.  This is more than the soft bigotry of low 
expectations from the Court’s most liberal justice—it is unabashed white 
supremacy. 
The Court’s decisions in cases like Dred Scott, the Civil Rights 
Cases, and Plessy constitute juridical oppression, or juridical 
subordination.  Each case provided legal cover for the atrocities of 
slavery and Jim Crow to unfold across America.  For that reason, the 
Court is morally culpable for slavery and Jim Crow.  The Court, 
                                                          
 35. HARRY S. ASHMORE, HEARTS AND MINDS: THE ANATOMY OF RACISM FROM ROOSEVELT 
TO REAGAN 138 (1982).  See generally John Hope Franklin, History of Racial Segregation in the 
United States, 304 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1, 1–2 (1956) (providing an overview of 
racial segregation throughout the entire nation). 
 36. See supra text accompanying notes 28–30. 
 37. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown 
v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522–23 
(1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting), abrogated by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995). 
 38. See BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION, supra note 31, at 11–12. 
 39. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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therefore, has incurred a moral obligation to atone for its unique 
participation in these past atrocities. 
IV. POST-BROWN JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY 
Brown v. Board of Education40 unconstitutionalized Jim Crow in 
public education and hence set the stage for its eventual demise.41  Given 
that important fact, it is reasonable to ask: does the Court’s post-Brown 
judicial philosophy constitute atonement for slavery and Jim Crow?  My 
answer is no, because the Court today employs several racially 
subordinating judicial philosophies.  Several structural elements that 
subtly, yet effectively, subordinate blacks are embedded in the Court’s 
judicial techniques. 
When the Court decides cases, it typically proceeds at three 
alternative levels, what I will refer to as Levels 1, 2, and 3.42  Level 1 is 
more commonly known as judicial positivism.  It can be defined as the 
quest for justice disciplined by extant rules.43  Judicial fidelity to past 
rules, what is sometimes called a “normativity of consistency,” is the 
hallmark of Level 1.44 
A jurisprudence of judicial consistency can be manifested as legal 
formalism or originalism (which is a feature of textualism).45  Neither 
expression of judicial consistency is friendly toward blacks.  For 
example, legal formalism consists of syllogistic reasoning loaded with 
nonprogressive, minimalist legal doctrine; mainly, liberty of contract, 
substantive due process, and vested property rights.46  These doctrines 
protect privilege and property, of which, today, as in the past, blacks 
                                                          
 40. 347 U.S. 483. 
 41. Brown v. Board of Education changed the legal status of blacks from mere supplicants 
begging to be treated as both full-fledged citizens of the United States and members of the human 
race, to persons entitled to equal treatment under the law.  This in turn made the burgeoning civil 
rights movement a less difficult struggle than it otherwise would have been.  For example, the 1964 
Civil Rights Act would not have been possible without Brown, for it is doubtful a racially skittish 
Congress would have passed a civil rights statute in contravention of the constitutional principle of 
separate-but-equal.  See Robert L. Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 
237 (1968). 
 42. See ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING FROM LEGAL 
FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 169–84 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter BROOKS, STRUCTURES]. 
 43. Id. at 183. 
 44. See id. at 170 (stating that judicial positivism’s normativity is the “idea that judicial 
decision making should be consistent not only with prior judicial rulings, but also with other 
governmental rulings . . .”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. at 49–51 (discussing how all three favor private redistribution of wealth, thus 
disfavoring weaker economic groups). 
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have far less than whites.47  Level 1, then, freezes the status quo.  It can 
even redistribute wealth upward, favoring the rich and powerful.48 
Level 1 incorporates a minimalist predisposition (a preference for a 
weak national government49) that works against blacks.  This fact was 
brought home by the Court’s use of formalism in the latter years of the 
Rehnquist Court.  “Between 1995 and 2000, the Court struck down all or 
part of twenty-five socially [progressive] federal statutes.”50  In each 
case, the Court ruled that Congress “exceeded its powers under the 
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”51 
Originalism, especially Justice Scalia’s brand of constitutional 
textualism, is a very dangerous judicial philosophy if one is black or any 
other minority.  Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence posits that the Constitution 
should be interpreted as it was written in 1791, the year in which the Bill 
of Rights was ratified.52  This is the so-called “Dead Constitution,” in 
contradistinction to the “Living Constitution,” which changes over time 
to keep up with society.53  Justice Scalia’s Dead Constitution is 
predicated on the belief that society has not gotten better since 1791, and 
that freedoms have diminished over time.54 
But for people of color, women, and homosexuals, society has gotten 
better.  Slavery is gone; women have the right to self-determination, 
including a legal identity separate from that of their husbands; and 
homosexuals can, for the most part, “come out of the closet.”  Some even 
hold high public office.  None of these “outsiders” wish to turn the clock 
back to 1791.  For them, going back to the future is no way to go. 
                                                          
 47. For example, the median net worth (bank accounts, stocks, bonds, real estate, and other 
assets) of white families is ten times more than that of black families ($67,000 versus $6166).  Press 
Release, Nat’l Urban League, State of Black America Report 2006 Reveals Economic Status for 
African Americans is Getting Worse (Mar. 27, 2006), http://www.nul.org/PressReleases/ 
2006/2006pr319.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).  The racial gap is unbelievably larger within 
socioeconomic strata; for example, today “white middle-class families [had] on average 113 times 
more in financial assets than black middle-class families.”  Weekly Bull., JOURNAL OF BLACKS IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION, For Financing Higher Education, the Racial Wealth Gap Remains Huge (Mar. 
1, 2007), http://www.jbhe.com/latest/index030107_p.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).  See generally 
MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH / WHITE WEALTH: A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (2d ed. 2006) (analyzing racial inequality and the racial 
wealth gap in America). 
 48. See BROOKS, STRUCTURES, supra note 42, at 49. 
 49. See id. at 39. 
 50. Id. at 59. 
 51. Id.  Perhaps the most controversial case involved gender rather than race.  In United States 
v. Morrison, the Court struck down a remedial provision of the Violence Against Women Act.  529 
U.S. 598, 602 (2000). 
 52. See BROOKS, STRUCTURES, supra note 42, at 72. 
 53. See id. at 71–72. 
 54. See id. at 72. 
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Most tellingly, Justice Scalia’s constitutional textualism not only 
embraces originalism (text frozen in time), but it also implicitly 
incorporates minimalism (the reduction of judicial discretion).55  Neither 
of these components would sustain the Court’s decision in the most 
important civil rights case in history, Brown v. Board of Education.56  
For example, Justice Scalia’s originalism would reject reading the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a prohibition against segregation in public 
education.  “[T]he Amendment’s framers, the Thirty-ninth Congress, 
intended the Amendment to be read in harmony with” segregation—that 
is to say, “separate-but-equal.”57  “Indeed, Congress made no attempt to 
desegregate the public schools of Washington, D.C.  These schools, as 
well as the public schools in the home districts of virtually every 
congressman who voted for the Amendment, were segregated both 
before and after the Amendment’s passage.”58 
Like his originalism, Justice Scalia’s minimalism would also reject 
the Court’s reasoning in Brown.  Rather than minimizing itself, the 
Supreme Court in Brown actually enlarged itself.  It did so by 
overturning every state school segregation statute in the country, as well 
as seventy-five years of its own precedent.59 
As an alternative to Level 1, the Court often proceeds at Level 2, 
which is commonly called judicial pragmatism.60  Judge Richard Posner 
opines that most of the great judges over the years have been judicial 
pragmatists.61  Level 2 can be defined as the quest for justice disciplined 
by what comes before the decision in the case (namely, rules and public 
policies) and by what comes after the decision (namely, the 
consequences the decision will have on a community).62  Unlike Level 1, 
Level 2 is consequentialist and policy-oriented.63 
The problem with this judicial philosophy from the perspective of 
blacks is that it does not go far enough in placing the judge in the path of 
unjust majorities.  Level 2 is too respectful of the dominant community 
norms or expectations.64  A Level 2 judge is constrained by what Justice 
                                                          
 55. See id. at 75. 
 56. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 57. BROOKS, STRUCTURES, supra note 42, at 76.  For a discussion of the separate-but-equal 
doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 31–33. 
 58. BROOKS, STRUCTURES, supra note 42, at 76. 
 59. See id. at 77. 
 60. See id. at 172–74. 
 61. See id. at 172. 
 62. See id. at 183. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. at 174. 
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Oliver Wendell Holmes referred to as “[t]he felt necessities of the 
time.”65  The judge cannot override strongly felt community expectations 
or values.  Judge Posner, a master pragmatist, illustrates this point when 
he asserts that he “would not create a constitutional right of same-sex 
marriage because that would entail the imposition of ‘a social policy that 
is deeply offensive to the vast majority of . . . [American] citizens.’”66 
In short, the problem with judicial pragmatism is that it is more 
majoritarian than egalitarian.  Judicial pragmatism does not go far 
enough to protect minority interests.  It does not permit a judge to impose 
norms on a community before the community is ready or willing to 
accept them.  In other words, it does not allow “judicial policy-
making.”67 
The final level at which the Court traditionally operates, although not 
often, is Level 3.  This is more commonly referred to as judicial 
nominalism.68  Level 3 can be described as the “search for justice 
disciplined only by the facts of the case.”69  The judge seeks justice in the 
case sub judice without regard to what comes before the decision or by 
what comes after the decision.70  Judicial nominalism’s normativity, 
then, is the judge’s commitment to the best results in particular cases.71  
The judge is an activist and is not afraid to make law or policy, although 
he or she is reluctant to openly admit it. 
One judge who was not afraid to admit his activism, albeit only after 
he had stepped down from the bench and was close to death, is the late 
Judge Skelly Wright.  One of the most celebrated federal judges in the 
last half of the twentieth century, Judge Wright said in an interview 
shortly before his death: 
‘I guess I am an activist, but I want to do what’s right.  When I get a 
case, I look at it and the first thing I think of automatically is what’s 
right, what should be done—and then you look at the law to see 
whether or not you can do it.  That might invert the process of how you 
should arrive at a decision, of whether you should look at the law first, 
but [with me] it developed through making decisions, which involves 
resolving problems. . . .  And I am less patient than other judges with 
law that won’t permit what I conceive to be fair.  Now, there’s a 
                                                          
 65. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963). 
 66. See BROOKS, STRUCTURES, supra note 42, at 190. 
 67. For a more detailed discussion of this concept of judicial policy-making, see id. at 16–21. 
 68. See id. at 174–82. 
 69. Id. at 183. 
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moral viewpoint gives license to just about any type of judicial action). 
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legitimate criticism of that, because what’s fair and just to X may not 
be fair and just to Y—in perfect good faith on both sides.  But if you 
don’t take it to extremes, I think that it’s good to come out with a fair 
and just result and then look for law to support it.’72 
Level 3 is problematic from a black perspective because it gives the 
judge too much discretion.  Unbridled judicial power can act as an easy 
cover for conscious or unconscious bias against blacks.  This is one of 
the lessons of critical theory. 
Critical theory offers a general criticism of all three judicial models: 
Levels 1, 2, and 3.73  It holds that each level operates upon the false 
assumption that our socio-legal order is fundamentally objective when it 
comes to matters of race, gender, or sexual orientation.  Judge Posner’s 
pragmatic views about same-sex marriage would seem to support the 
critical theorists observation,74 as do the race-related defects in each level 
of judicial reasoning just mentioned.75  The criticalist argument is that 
our socio-legal order and American culture in general are not culturally 
objective.76  American society, in a word, is anti-objective.77 
For example, mainstream American society, critical theorists 
maintain, is not objective when it comes to race.78  American socio-legal 
arrangements are racially anti-objective, or “racist,” because they give 
white Americans a cultural advantage.79  “Racism,” as viewed by critical 
theorists, is less about racial antipathy, animus, or malevolent intent on 
the part of, say, individual Supreme Court Justices than about the cues 
the Court as an institution gives regarding what is culturally important 
and deserving of the Court’s imprimatur.80  Hence, “racism” is not just 
about motivational bias, it is also about cognitive bias—the way in which 
we rationally order the external world, especially racial relations and 
identities.81  Cognitive bias is manifested in the actions of the republican 
official who, during the 2008 presidential election, distributed a 
caricature of Barack Obama surrounded by ribs, watermelon, and fried 
chicken.82  Although the official insisted she was not being racist and she 
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is not a white supremacist, the critical theorists would say intent has 
nothing to do with it.  As viewed by critical theorists, “racism” 
incorporates all the negative ways in which whites actually see blacks. 
V. HOW TO EFFECTUATE THE COURT’S ATONEMENT 
Given the identified deficiencies in the Court’s extant judicial 
philosophies, the question becomes: how can the Court effectuate its 
atonement for slavery and Jim Crow?  What does practical idealism 
suggest?83  The issue does not concern the apology as much as the 
reparation.  A judicial apology is a straightforward proposition, as the 
Court need only issue a simple statement of remorse.  The reparation is 
more complex.  In my view, it should entail the adoption of a judicial 
mindset that is self-consciously attuned to the life experiences of black 
Americans in today’s society.  The Court must vindicate black values 
whenever it has the discretion to do so.84  This may be the only way the 
Court can respond effectively to anti-objectivism.  That is my idealism. 
The practical side of practical idealism would place the Court’s 
validation of black values within the traditional framework of judicial 
decision-making.  Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, the principal pioneers of 
the legal process model in jurisprudence, have described the essential 
feature of the traditional judicial technique.85  According to Hart and 
Sacks, when a judge decides a case, she typically does so by 
“elaborating” the arrangements that form the basis of the decision in the 
case.86  The judge, in other words, relates her reasoning back to existing 
arrangements—cultural norms as well as extant rules of law (statutory, 
constitutional, judge-made, and administrative).  A judicial decision is 
unique in that, unlike other governmental officials, the judge, if he acts 
legitimately, identifies the established grounds on which the decision 
rests.87  Importantly, these grounds preexist the decision; they are not 
made up by the judge after the case is filed.88  Hence, we have the 
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famous principle: “reasoned elaboration from existing arrangements.”89  
We certainly see this ex ante decision-making structure in Levels 1 and 
2,90 but less so in Level 3,91 which, in any event, is deemed by many to 
be an illegitimate form of judicial decision-making.  Level 3 does not, 
however, have much of a presence in Anglo American law.92 
Thus, within the traditional structure of Anglo American law we 
need to construct a kind of outsider jurisprudence that acts as the Court’s 
reparation for slavery and Jim Crow.  This can be done quite simply by 
the Court using reasoning based on well-established black values 
whenever possible.  By giving deference to such external, extant 
arrangement, the Court not only avoids the type of ad hoc, unstable 
judicial decision-making for which Level 3 judges have been criticized, 
but she also mainstreams and, hence, legitimizes black values.  What 
better way for the Court to atone for its participation in the atrocities of 
slavery and Jim Crow? 
The governing principle, then, is reasoned elaboration from existing 
black values.  As an institution, the Court can face its past moral 
transgressions visited upon blacks by vindicating the black perspective, 
which is too often subordinated under the Court’s existing judicial 
philosophies.  This reparatory standard of judicial review would help to 
counteract the white privilege, or anti-objectivism, that still has a definite 
presence in our legal system more than a half-century after Brown v. 
Board of Education. 
I will give an example of the proposed judicial reparation, which can 
be called “outsider jurisprudence.”  My intention here is to be suggestive 
rather than comprehensive; in other words, move the discussion toward a 
more detailed consideration of outsider jurisprudence—a vision of the 
Court in post-atonement America.  For purposes of illustration I shall use 
a non-racial legal problem, but one that, nonetheless, involves an 
outsider group.  Taking the discussion out of the hyper-sensitive context 
of race may enable the reader to see the logic and reasonableness of 
outsider jurisprudence more clearly. 
Plaintiff, a resident of California who has partial custody of her 
children, sues her former husband, a resident of New York, for child 
support.  The case is filed in a California court.  The trial court grants the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on 
grounds that the defendant has not stepped foot in California in the last 
                                                          
 89. Id. at 138. 
 90. See supra text accompanying notes 42–43, 60–62. 
 91. See supra text accompanying notes 68–72. 
 92. See BROOKS, STRUCTURES, supra note 42, at 174–82. 
1.0 BROOKS FINAL 4/23/2009  1:12:41 PM 
2009] TOWARD A POST-ATONEMENT AMERICA 753 
sixteen or so years, and has no other “minimum contacts” with the forum 
state.93  Upon appeal, the California appellate courts affirm the trial 
court’s dismissal of the action.  Subsequently, the case is appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court.  There, the justices uphold the California 
Supreme Court’s judgment on grounds that the defendant lacks minimum 
contacts with the state.  Under the minimum contacts doctrine, the 
defendant must have sufficient contact with the forum state as a 
precondition for the state to render a valid judgment against the 
defendant.94  The Court construes minimum contacts to mean 
commercial ties between the defendant and the forum state.95  
Accordingly, because “[t]he cause of action herein asserted arises, not 
from the defendant’s commercial transactions in interstate commerce, 
but rather from his personal, domestic relations,”96 the California 
Supreme Court’s judgment is affirmed.97 
The Court’s judgment and reasoning subordinates women by making 
it difficult, if not impossible, for them to sue for child support against a 
nonresident ex-husband.  Had the Court used outsider jurisprudence, 
both its judgment and reasoning would have been more accommodating.  
The female plaintiff would have been given her day in court and, in the 
process, the Court would have validated well-established outsider (in this 
case gender) values relevant to the facts of the case.  Specifically, the 
Court’s interpretation of the minimum contacts doctrine would reach 
back to the relevant gender value of care and connection, in this case, the 
nurturing of children.  Psychological studies show that “women 
experience themselves through connections and relationships to others 
while men see themselves as separately identified individuals. . . . 
[W]omen express . . . vulnerability instead of strength, and 
responsiveness instead of independence.”98 
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Thus, the love of children, the special historical relationship that 
women have with children, would inform the way in which the Court 
defines minimum contacts.  This important legal doctrine would include 
personal ties as well as commercial ties.  The California Supreme Court’s 
judgment would be reversed because the defendant’s relationship with 
his children would be deemed sufficient to establish minimum contacts 
between the defendant and the forum state.  A child is more than a 
minimum contact; he is a meaningful contact. 
The point I wish to make is this: outsider jurisprudence is possible.  
Judges can render decisions that elaborate on existing outsider 
arrangements.  Further, outsider values are not necessarily unreasonable.  
They do make sense—legally, culturally, and morally.  The Court need 
only discover and apply these values.  In doing so, the Court could 
embrace outsider jurisprudence as its reparatory response to the atrocities 
of slavery and Jim Crow for which it bears no dearth of moral 
culpability. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
My argument for judicial atonement can be summarized in the 
following syllogism: when a government or a government institution 
“commits an atrocity against an innocent people, it has, at the very least, 
a moral obligation to apologize and to make that apology believable by 
doing something tangible called a ‘reparation.’”99  The United States 
Supreme Court committed atrocities against an innocent people by 
upholding the legality of racial oppression in the forms of slavery and 
Jim Crow.  Ergo, the Court “should, in fact, atone—that is, both 
apologize and provide reparations”—for slavery and Jim Crow.100  
Outsider jurisprudence is one way the Court can effectuate such 
atonement. 
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